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Introduction
The Turing Test has served as a deﬁning inspiration
throughout the early history of artiﬁcial intelligence re-
search. Its centrality arises in part because verbal behavior
indistinguishable from that of humans seems like an in-
controvertible criterion for intelligence, a “philosophical
conversation stopper” as Dennett (1985) says. On the other
hand, from the moment Turing’s seminal article (Turing,
1950) was published, the conversation hasn’t stopped; the
appropriateness of the Test has been continually questioned,
and current philosophical wisdom holds that the Turing Test
is hopelessly ﬂawed as a sufﬁcient condition for attributing
intelligence.
In this short article, I summarize for an artiﬁcial intelli-
gence audience an argument that I have presented at length
for a philosophical audience (Shieber, to appear) that at-
tempts to reconcile these two mutually contradictory but
well-founded attitudes towards the Turing Test that have
been under constant debate since 1950 (Shieber, 2004).
The arguments against the sufﬁciency of the Turing Test
for determining intelligence rely on showing that some ex-
traconditionsarelogicallynecessaryforintelligencebeyond
the behavioral properties exhibited by a subject under a Tur-
ing Test. Therefore, it cannot follow logically from passing
a Turing Test that the agent is intelligent. I will argue that
these extra conditions can be revealed by the Turing Test,
so long as we allow a very slight weakening of the criterion
from one of logical proof to one of statistical proof under
weak realizability assumptions. Crucially, this weakening is
so slight as to make no conceivable difference from a practi-
cal standpoint. Thus, the Gordian knot between the two op-
posing views of the sufﬁciency of the Turing Test can be cut.
The Essence of the Turing Test
The Turing Test is, at its heart, a test of the adequacy of an
agent’s verbal behavior. Block (1981) characterizes it as a
test of the ability to “produce a sensible sequence of verbal
responses to a sequence of verbal stimuli”. Turing’s own
∗Igratefullyacknowledgebyreferencethelargenumberofpeo-
ple acknowledged in my paper on which this summary is based
(Shieber, to appear).
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descriptions of the Test (Newman et al., 1952) accord with
this view:
The idea of the test is that the machine has to pretend to
be a man, by answering questions put to it, and it will
only pass if the pretence is reasonably convincing....
We had better suppose that each jury has to judge quite
a number of times, and that sometimes they really are
dealing with a man and not a machine. That will pre-
vent them saying “It must be a machine” every time
without proper consideration.
Turing’s original presentation of the test is couched in terms
of an imitation game between two entities, a person and
a machine, with the goal of seeing if in repeated forced
choices a judge can do no better than chance at determining
which is which on the basis of verbal interactions with each.
The introduction of the human confederate and the forced
choice merely serve to make more clear and operational
what constitutes “sensibility” of the machine’s responses.
Thus, at base, the Turing Test is founded on the idea that
ability to produce sensible verbal behavior is an indication
of intelligence. The syllogism that underlies the appropri-
ateness of the Turing Test as a criterion for intelligence pro-
ceeds something like this:
Premise 1: If an agent passes a Turing Test, then it pro-
duces a sensible sequence of verbal responses to a se-
quence of verbal stimuli.
Premise 2: If an agent produces a sensible sequence of ver-
bal responses to a sequence of verbal stimuli, then it is
intelligent.
Conclusion: Therefore, if an agent passes a Turing Test,
then it is intelligent.
Block refers to a premise such as the second one as the
“Turing Test conception of intelligence”, and his (and oth-
ers’) repudiation of the Turing Test as a criterion for intelli-
gence is based on a denial of this premise.
For instance, passing a Turing Test on a single occasion
might be the result of chance. Even monkeys on typewrit-
ers might “produce a sensible sequence of verbal responses”
on (astronomically rare) occasion. (For this reason, Turing
would have multiple tests be run.) Thus, the premise ought
to be interpreted as a general capacity, not an occasional
feat. But as we will see, even this reinterpretation of Premise
2 is insufﬁcient.The Argument Against a Behaviorist Test
The anti-behaviorist argument against the Turing Test as a
sufﬁcient condition for intelligence was apparently ﬁrst pro-
posed in sketch form by Shannon & McCarthy (1956, page
vi): “A disadvantage of the Turing deﬁnition of thinking is
that it is possible, in principle, to design a machine with a
complete set of arbitrarily chosen responses to all possible
input stimuli.... With a suitable dictionary such a machine
would surely satisfy Turing’s deﬁnition but does not reﬂect
our usual intuitive concept of thinking.”
In “Psychologism and Behaviorism”, Block (1981)
presents the argument in its most fully worked out form.
Imagine (with Block) a hypothetical machine that stores
a tree of interactions providing a sensible response for
each possible interrogator’s input in each possible conver-
sational context of up to, say, one hour long. (These re-
sponses might be modeled on those that Block’s ﬁctional
Aunt Bertha would have given.) Such a tree would unde-
niably be large, but processing in it would be conceptually
straightforward. By hypothesis, such an “Aunt Bertha ma-
chine” would pass a Turing Test of up to one hour, because
its responses would be indistinguishable from that of Aunt
Bertha, whose responses it recorded. Such a machine is
clearly not intelligent—Block (1981) says it “has the intelli-
gence of a toaster”, and Shannon and McCarthy would pre-
sumably agree—by the same token that the teletype that the
interrogator interacts with in conversation with the human
confederate in a Turing Test is not intelligent; it is merely
the conduit for some other person’s intelligence, the human
confederate. Similarly, the Aunt Bertha machine is merely
the conduit for the intelligence of Aunt Bertha. Yet just as
surely, it can pass a Turing Test, and more, has the capacity
to pass arbitrary Turing Tests of up to an hour. The mere
logical possibility of an Aunt Bertha machine is sufﬁcient
to undermine premise 2, even under a reinterpretation as re-
quiring a general capacity.
It seems to me that Shannon, McCarthy, and Block are
right in principle: Such a machine is conceptually possible;
hence the Turing Test is not logically sufﬁcient as a condi-
tion of intelligence. Let us suppose this view is correct and,
as Block argues, some further criterion is needed regarding
the manner in which the machine works. Some further cri-
terion is needed, but how much of a criterion is that, and can
the Turing Test test for it? Although Block calls this fur-
ther internal property “nonbehavioral”, I will argue that the
mere behavior of passing a Turing Test can reveal the prop-
erty. Borrowing an idea from theoretical computer science,
I argue that the Turing Test can be viewed as an interac-
tive proof not only of the fact of sensible verbal behavior,
but of a capacity to generate sensible verbal behavior, and
to do so “in the right way”. Assuming some extraordinarily
weak conditions on physical realizability, any Turing-Test–
passing agent must possess a sufﬁcient property to vitiate
Block’s argument. In summary, Block’s arguments are not
sufﬁcient to negate the Turing Test as a criterion of intelli-
gence, at least under a very slight weakening of the notion
of “criterion”.
Block pursues a number of potential objections to his ar-
gument, the most signiﬁcant of which (his “Objection 8”)
is based on the fact that the Aunt Bertha machine is expo-
nentially large, that is, its size is exponential in the length
of the conversation. Objection 8 leads to his “amended
neo-Turing-Test conception”: “Intelligence is the capacity
to emit sensible sequences of responses to stimuli, so long
as this is accomplished in a way that averts exponential ex-
plosion of search.” (Emphasis in original.) It is not exactly
clear what “exponential explosion of search” is intended to
indicate in general. In the case of the Aunt Bertha machine,
exponentiality surfaces in the size of the machine, not the
time complexity of the search. Further, the aspect of the
Aunt Bertha machine that conﬂicts with our intuitions about
intelligence is its reliance upon memorization. Removing
the possibility of exponential storage amounts to a prohibi-
tion against memorization.1 Consequently, an appropriate
rephrasing of Premise 2 is
The compact conception of intelligence: If an agent has
the capacity to produce a sensible sequence of verbal re-
sponses to a sequence of verbal stimuli, whatever they
may be, and without requiring storage exponential in the
length of the sequence, then the agent is intelligent.
Again, Block notes that this additional condition is psychol-
ogistic in mentioning a nonbehavioral condition, viz., that
the manner of the processing must avert combinatorial ex-
plosion of storage. He claims that insofar as the condition is
psychologistic, a Turing Test cannot test for it.
To summarize, Block’s Aunt Bertha argument forces us
to pay up on two psychologistic promissory notes. For the
purely behavioral Turing Test to demonstrate intelligence,
it must sufﬁce as a demonstration of the antecedent of the
compact conception of intelligence, that is, it must indicate
a general capacity to produce a sensible sequence of verbal
responses and it must demonstrate compactness of storage
of the agent.
The Interactive Proof Alternative
Turning to the capacity issue ﬁrst, there is certainly no de-
ductive move that allows one to go from observation of the
passing of one or more Turing Tests to a conclusion of a gen-
eral capacity; the monkeys and typewriters argument shows
that. This is the Humean problem of induction. But it does
not follow that there is no method of reasoning from the for-
mer to the latter. I will argue that the powerful notion of an
interactive proof, taken from theoretical computer science,
is exactly such a reasoning method. Furthermore, as dis-
cussed below, Turing Tests bear some of the tell-tale signs
of interactive proofs that have been investigated in the com-
puter science literature.
Interactive proofs are protocols designed to convince a
veriﬁer conventionally denotedV that a prover P has certain
knowledge or abilities, which we will think of as being en-
capsulated in an assertion s.2 In a classical (deductive) proof
1For this reason, adding this extra condition to the conception
of intelligence is not ad hoc. It amounts to saying, in a precise way,
that the agent must have the capacity to produce sensible responses
without having memorized them.
2For convenience in reference, we will refer to V and P using
gendered pronouns “she” and “he” respectively.system, P would merely reveal a deductive proof of s, which
V then veriﬁes. This provides V with knowledge of s and
perhaps other knowledge implicit in the proof. Interactive
proofs augment classical proof systems by adding notions of
randomization and interaction between prover and veriﬁer.
(The interaction implicit in classical proof systems — P’s
presenting V with the proof — is essentially trivial.) Inter-
action is added by allowing V and P to engage in rounds of
message-passing. Randomization is introduced in two ways:
First, the veriﬁer may make use of random bits in construct-
ing her messages. Second, she may be required to be sat-
isﬁed with a probabilistic notion of proof. When we state
that P proves s with an interactive proof, we mean (implic-
itly) that s has been proved but with a certain determinable
residual probability of error. That is, the veriﬁer may need to
be satisﬁed with some small and quantiﬁable chance that the
protocol indicates that s is true when in fact it is not, or vice
versa. The residual error is the reason that moving to a no-
tion of interactive proofs is a weakening relative to a view as
a deductive proof. The fact that the residual error can rapidly
be made vanishingly small through repeated protocols is the
reason that the weakening is referred to as “very slight”.
The Turing Test as an Interactive Proof of Capacity
I view the Turing Test as an interactive proof for the
antecedent of the capacity conception of intelligence, that
is, it is a proof that P “has the capacity to produce a sensible
sequence of verbal responses to a sequence of verbal stimuli,
whatever they may be”. Consider the space of all possible
sequences of verbal stimuli. Let the fraction of this space
for which P generates sensible responses be tp. An agent
without a general capacity to produce sensible sequences
of responses would fail to do so on some nontrivial fraction
of this space. Block notes that a 100% criterion is neither
necessary nor appropriate. One wants to be able to “ask of
a system that fails the test whether the failure really does
indicate that the system lacks the disposition to pass the
test.” Indeed, people put under similar tests would at least
occasionally perform in such a way that a judge might deem
the responses not sensible. So there is some percentage
tl, less than 100%, such that if an agent produced sensible
sequences of responses on that percentage of the space (that
is, tp >tl), we can attribute a general capacity, sufﬁcient for
the antecedent of the capacity conception. Let us say, for the
sake of argument, that tl = 1/2. Thus, if an agent produces
sensible responses to 50% of the space of possible verbal
stimuli, we will consider it to have a general capacity to
produce such responses. Importantly, we are not saying that
the agent must merely produce sensible responses to 50% of
some subsample of possible stimuli that we confront it with,
but with 50% of all possible stimuli, in a counterfactual
sense, whether we ever test it with these stimuli or not.
Suppose we sample k sequences of verbal stimuli uni-
formly from this space, and test some agent as to whether it
generates sensible sequences of responses to them. Suppose
further that the agent does so on t of these stimuli, where
t is greater than a sample threshold ts > tl (say, ts = 3/4).
Can we conclude that the agent has a general capacity as
deﬁned above? A false positive occurs when a sample of k
inputs is selected where t > ts (the prover outperforms the
sample threshold on the sample), yet tp <tl (the subspace is
smaller than the deﬁnitional threshold). Using the method
of Chernoff bounds (see, e.g., Chapter 5 of the text by Mot-
wani (1995)), it can be shown that the probability of a false
positive is Pr[t > ts] < e−ck where c =
(tl−ts)2
2(1−tl). Thus, it has
the behavior of an interactive proof: As the number of sam-
ples k increases, the probability of a false positive decreases
exponentially.
It is important to realize that the probabilities of error that
we are talking about can be literally astronomically small.
For the bounds that we have been talking about, if we let k
be, say, 300, the false positive probability is on the order of
1 in 1010; at that rate, if a population the size of all humanity
were tested, one would expect to see no false positives. At
k = 1000, the false positive rate of some 1 in 1027 is truly
astronomically small.
In summary, a protocol in which we run k Turing Tests
and receive sensible responses on an appropriate fraction
provides exponentially strong evidence that the agent sat-
isﬁes the antecedent of the capacity conception, that is, has
a general capacity to produce sensible responses to verbal
stimuli, whatever they may be. One may quibble with the
various bounds proposed. (Should tl be 50%? 80%? 99%?)
Varying them does not change the basic character of the ar-
gument. It merely adjusts the number of samples needed
before the knee in the exponential curve.
Thus, under the notion of proof provided by interactive
proofs, the Turing Test can provide a proof of a general ca-
pacity to produce a sensible sequence of verbal responses to
a sequence of verbal stimuli, whatever they may be. It can
therefore unmask the monkeys on typewriters.
The Turing Test as an Interactive Proof of
Compactness
Theinteractiveproofapproachprovidesleveragefordemon-
strating compactness as well. When all we know is the
agent’s performance on a ﬁxed sample of stimuli, the stor-
age requirements to generate these responses is linear in the
length of the stimuli. But the size of any ﬁxed fraction of the
space of possible stimuli is exponential in their length. By
being able to reason from the sample to the fraction of the
space as a whole — as the interactive proof approach allows
—wecanconcludethatanagentusingamemorizationstrat-
egy (as the Aunt Bertha machine) would require exponential
storage capacity to achieve this performance. Conversely,
any agent not possessing exponential storage capacity would
fail the interactive proof.
Nonetheless, how can a Turing Test reveal that the ma-
chine doesn’t have exponential storage capacity? The com-
pact conception would require that the agent pass Turing
tests at least logarithmic in its storage capacity. Thus, with-
out bounding its storage capacity, we can’t bound the length
of the Test we would need. There is no purely logical ar-
gument against this possibility; the Aunt Bertha argument
shows this. Some further assumption must be made to pay
the compactness promissory note. I now turn to how weak
an assumption is required.Suppose we could bound the information capacity of the
universe. Then any physically realizable agent that could
pass Turing Tests whose length exceeded the logarithm of
this amount would satisfy the compact conception. We
would be able to bound the length of the Turing Test re-
quired under the compact conception, at least for any agent
that is no larger than the universe. (And of course, no agent
is larger than the universe.) We will call this length bound
thecriticalTuringTestlength. Onemightworrythatthecrit-
ical Turing Test length might be centuries or millennia long.
Without going into detail (which I have provided else-
where (Shieber, to appear)), the information capacity of the
universe can be estimated based on the holographic princi-
ple (regarding which see the survey by Bousso (2002) for
a review) and estimates of the time since the Big Bang. To-
gether, these lead to a reasonable upper bound of some 10120
bits. Rounding up by 80 orders of magnitude, call it 10200.
Descending now from these ethereal considerations to the
concrete goal of analyzing the Turing Test conceptions of
intelligence, under the compact conception, we would re-
quire an agent with this literally astronomical storage capac-
ity to have a capacity to pass Turing Tests of on the order of
log210200 ≈ 670 bits. The entropy of English is about one
bitpercharacterorﬁvebitsperword(Shannon,1951), sowe
require a critical Turing Test length of around 670 characters
or 140 words. At a natural speaking rate of some 200 words
per minute, a conversation of less than a minute would there-
fore unmask a Turing-Test subject whose performance, like
that of the Aunt Bertha machine, is based on memorization.
In essence, I have argued for the following recasting of
the basic syllogism supporting the sufﬁciency of the Turing
Test:
Premise 1: If an agent passes k rounds of a Turing Test of at
least one minute in length, then (with probability of error
exponentially small in k) it has the capacity to produce
a sensible sequence of verbal responses to a sequence of
verbal stimuli that is logarithmic in the storage capacity
of the agent, whatever they may be.
Premise 2: If an agent has the capacity to produce a sensi-
ble sequence of verbal responses to a sequence of verbal
stimuli that is logarithmic in the storage capacity of the
agent, whatever they may be, then it is intelligent.
Conclusion: Therefore, if an agent passes k rounds of a
Turing Test of at least one minute in length, then (with
probability of error exponentially small in k) it is intelli-
gent.
As contributory evidence for this view of the Turing Test
as an interactive proof, I note that the Turing Test shares
various other properties with interactive proofs, such as
Nontransferability: Turing tests, like other interactive
proofs, provide proof only to the veriﬁer, and not third
parties. This property is familiar to those of us in the
natural-language-processing ﬁeld as the “cooked demo”.
Lack of closure under composition: Turing Tests, like
other interactive proofs, may lose their proof character-
istics under composition. For example, Turing Tests are
subject to a “man-in-the-middle attack”, by which an
agent that can’t pass a singleton Turing Test can do so by
simultaneously participating as judge in another.
Conclusion
I have argued that the Turing Test is appropriately viewed
not as a deductive or inductive proof but as an interactive
proof of the intelligence of a subject-under-test. This view
is evidenced both by the similarity in form between Turing
Tests and interactive proof protocols and by the sharing of
important properties between Turing Tests and interactive
proofs.
In so doing, I provide a counterargument against Block’s
demonstration that the Turing Test is not a sufﬁcient crite-
rion of intelligence. The counterargument requires a (very
slight) weakening of the conditions required of the Turing
Test — weakening the notion of proof (from classical deduc-
tive proof to interactive proof with its exponentially small
residual error probability) and strengthening the notion of
possible agent (from one of logical possibility to one with a
trivial realizability requirement). These weakenings are suf-
ﬁciently mild that they can be seen as providing foundation
for the view that the Turing Test is a sound sufﬁcient condi-
tion for intelligence. Block is right, yet Dennett may be too.
It merits pointing out that this view of the Turing Test is
consonant with (though by no means implicit in) Turing’s
view of the Test as presented in his writings. His view of
the Test as being statistical in nature and his pragmatic ori-
entation toward its efﬁcacy are of a piece with its status as
an interactive rather than classical proof.
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